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INTRODUCTION 
 
Known for his role as an intellectual property “entrepreneur”1, Mr. 
Leo Stoller is the prototypical trademark troll.2 Stoller has made it his 
business to sue as many parties as possible for the use of “his” 
STEALTH trademark.3 One court recently described Stoller as 
                                                 
* J.D. candidate, May 2008, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of 
Technology; pursuing Certificate in Intellectual Property Law; B.A. Political 
Science, June 2005, DePaul University. 
1 Colin Moynihan, He Says He Owns The Word ‘Stealth’ (Actually, He Claims 
‘Chutzpa’, Too), N.Y. TIMES, July 4, 2005, accessible at: http://www.nytimes.com 
/2005/07/04/business/04stealth.html. 
2 The trademark troll sets out to register as many marks as possible, without the 
intent to use and invest in the mark. Just as the “forest troll” appears to collect his 
“toll” from travelers passing over a bridge, the trademark troll magically appears 
when an unsuspecting producer adopts the same or similar mark and poses upon 
them two choices: pay to get a license to use my mark or litigate. 
3 Central Manufacturing, Inc. v. Brett, 492 F.3d 876, 880 (7th Cir. 2007) 
(“Acting as a sort of intellectual property entrepreneur, Stoller has federally 
registered scores of trademarks with the U.S. PTO…many containing everyday 
words that regularly pop up in commercial enterprise”). 
1
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“running an industry that produces often spurious, vexatious, and 
harassing federal litigation.”4 The problem with Mr. Stoller is that the 
intellectual property community and the courts doubt whether Stoller 
actually uses the STEALTH mark on actual goods sold in commerce.5 
Rather, he merely exploits his trademark registrations to negotiate and 
extract licensing fees from companies using the mark on their own 
products.6 Some of those third parties, when threatened with litigation, 
have entered into licensing or settlement agreements for use of the 
STEALTH mark. These agreements cover a startling collection of 
products, ranging from “hand tools to make prosthetic limbs to 
construction consulting services to track lighting.”7 It was reported that 
Stoller even accused Sony Pictures of infringing the STEALTH mark 
by including the word as the title of a film featuring Navy pilots.8 
Although Stoller purports to have been hired to serve as a 
trademark expert at various trademark trials throughout the country,9 
his situation exemplifies a common misunderstanding that exists 
among the public, legal practitioners, and even district courts. The 
mere federal registration of a mark does not give the trademark owner 
a monopoly over that mark; as the Seventh Circuit has noted, “bare 
registration is not enough.”10 Under the Lanham Trademark Act, a 
                                                 
4 Central Manufacturing, Inc. v. Brett, No. 04 C 3049, 2005 WL 2445898 at *1 
(N.D. Ill. Sept. 30, 2005) aff’d, 492 F.3d 876, 880 (7th Cir. 2007).  
5 Id. at *2. 
6 Id.  
7 Id.  
8 Moynihan, supra note 1. 
9  Stoller’s website is accessible at: http://rentmark.blogspot.com. On this site 
Stoller identifies himself as the “Director and national spokesman” [sic] for the 
Americans for the Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, which “advocates the 
strict enforcement of American intellectual property rights”. He also identifies 
himself as a “Trademark Expert” and offers the following services:  “trademark 
valuations, licensing, appeal drafting etc.” 
10 Custom Vehicles, Inc. v. Forest River, Inc., 476 F.3d 481, 485 (7th Cir. 
2007); see also Zazu Designs v. L’Oreal, S.A., 979 F.2d 499, 504 (7th Cir. 1992) 
(registration itself only establishes a rebuttable presumption of use as of the filing 
date.”); Allard Enter., Inc. v. Advanced Programming Resources, Inc., 146 F.3d 350, 
356 (6th Cir. 1998) (“One of the bedrock principles of trademark law is that 
trademark or service marks ownership is not acquired by federal or state registration. 
2
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trademark owner must use the mark in commerce to acquire and 
maintain ownership rights in that mark.11 This requirement operates to 
prevent the “banking” or “warehousing” of marks.12 Warehousing is a 
term used to describe the practice of a party that registers trademarks 
and effectively collects and stores them as opposed to actually using 
them. This type of activity is barred both under the Lanham Act and at 
common law. One cannot register a trademark, cease using the mark 
on ones’ products and/or services, and then attempt to extract a 
licensing fee from sellers of products or services well-suited to adopt 
that trademark.13 This type of operation was, and continues to be, 
Stoller’s modus operandi.14 Stoller or one of his corporate entities have 
been involved in at least 49 cases in the Northern District of Illinois 
alone and at least 47 of them purport to involve trademark 
infringement.15 Tellingly, no court has ever found infringement of any 
trademark allegedly held by Stoller or his related companies in any 
reported opinion.16 Although one would think that these staggering 
statistics alone would deter Stoller, this apparently has not been the 
case. In fact, Stoller’s cases have generally “proven so frivolous and 
                                                                                                                   
Rather, ownership rights flow only from prior appropriation and actual use in the 
market.”);  Boxcar Media, LLC v. Redneckjunk, LLC, 345 F. Supp. 2d 76, 79 (D. 
Mass. 2004) (“Federal registration is irrelevant to a determination of whether a 
trademark is granted protection.”). 
11 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006). 
12 Custom Vehicles, Inc., 476 F.3d 481 at 485.  
13 See id.  
14 See Central Manufacturing, Inc. v. Brett, 492 F.3d 876, 880 (7th Cir. 2007) 
(stating that this practice formed an “essential part of [Stoler’s] business strategy” 
and noting that if “there was a Hall of Fame for Hyperactive trademark litigators, 
Stoller would be on it”). 
15 Central Manufacturing, Inc. v. Brett, 2005 WL 2445898 *1, 1 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 
30, 2005) aff’d, 492 F.3d 876, 880 (7th Cir. 2007). 
16 Id. at *2. The Northern District court alone has ordered Stoller or his 
corporate entities to pay defendants' attorneys' fees and costs in at least six other 
reported cases: S Indus., Inc. v. Ecolab Inc., 1999 WL 162785, *1 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 16, 
1999); S Indus., Inc. v. Stone Age Equip., Inc., 12 F. Supp. 2d 796 (N.D. Ill. 1998); 
S Indus., Inc. v. Centra 2000, Inc., 1998 WL 157067 (N.D. Ill. Mar.31, 1998); S 
Indus., Inc. v. Diamond Multimedia Sys., Inc., 991 F.Supp. 1012 (N.D. Ill. 1998); S 
Indus., Inc. v. Diamond Multimedia Sys., Inc., 17 F. Supp. 2d 775 (N.D. Ill. 1998); S 
Indus., Inc. v. Hobbico, Inc., 940 F. Supp. 210 (N..D. Ill. 1996)  
3
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wasteful of court resources” that in his most recent action, the 
Northern District of Illinois enjoined him from filing any new civil 
action in the district courts without first obtaining the court’s 
permission.17 
In Central Manufacturing, Inc. v. Brett, the Seventh Circuit 
affirmed a decision of the Northern District of Illinois in which the 
court utilized two important weapons to counter Stoller’s most recent 
meritless trademark infringement suit: the power to order the 
cancellation of a trademark registration and the power to award 
attorney’s fees and costs to the prevailing party.18 Not only did the 
Seventh Circuit approve of the district courts decision to cancel the 
plaintiff’s mark, the court stated that “where . . . a registrant’s asserted 
rights to a mark are shown to be invalid, cancellation is not merely 
appropriate, it is the best course.”19 If the approach taken by the 
Seventh Circuit is implemented more often by district courts 
throughout the country, trademark trolls such as Stoller may think 
twice about bringing suit for infringement of a mark in which no 
protectable rights exist. 
This Comment proposes that other courts should follow the lead 
of the Seventh Circuit and that the cancellation-as-best-course rule 
should become the norm rather than the exception.20 A more liberal 
invocation of the court’s discretionary power of cancellation promotes 
trademark law’s three policy components: protection of producers, 
protection of consumers from confusion, and the encouragement of 
fair competition. Second, this policy assuages the costs associated with 
needless trademark litigation. Third, it places the public on notice of 
cancellations as ordered by the courts and provides increased certainty 
regarding trademark rights to the public. Finally, this policy also 
operates as a judicial “refreshing” mechanism for clearance of the 
unused trademark from the trademark register. The combination of 
mark cancellation and the award of attorney’s fees and costs to the 
prevailing party creates a powerful situation which may deter 
                                                 
17 Central Manufacturing, Inc., 492 F.3d at 881. 
18 Id. at 876. 
19 Id. at 883. 
20 Id.  
4
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trademark trolls, such as Stoller, from filing or threatening to file 
meritless suit against innocent parties for use of a mark he lacks valid 
ownerships rights. 
Section I of this Comment outlines the commercial use 
requirement as found in the Lanham Trademark Act (“Lanham Act”) 
including its connection to the acquisition of federal registration, 
determining priority among competing claimants, and its relevance to 
deterring trademark warehousing. This section also discusses the 
commercial use requirement’s relationship to the “triumvirate” − the 
consumers, producers, and competitors the Lanham Act seeks to 
protect. Section II analyzes the consequences of the failure to use a 
mark in commerce, particularly in the context of litigation, where non-
use is used to collaterally attack the registration of the plaintiff. Most 
importantly, this section discusses the power of the court to order the 
cancellation of registrations pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1119 of the 
Lanham Act. Section III discusses the practical, evidentiary issues of 
proof where a plaintiff must prove commercial use to establish 
ownership and prevail on an infringement claim. Section IV introduces 
the decision of the Seventh Circuit in Central Manufacturing. Section 
V discusses the Seventh Circuit’s view of proper invocation of the 
power of cancellation and the award of attorneys’ fees in cases 
involving trademark trolls and proposes the cancellation-as-best-
course is a valuable and recommended approach that other circuits 
should follow. Finally, Section VI sets forth a separate discussion of 
the award of attorneys’ fees and costs in trademark litigation in the 
Seventh Circuit and its role in deterring the trademark troll. 
 
I. BACKGROUND: THE LANHAM ACT AND TRADEMARK LAW POLICY 
 
The Lanham Act was created in 1946 and remains the federal 
statute governing trademark rights.21 The Act protects both registered 
and common law rights and defines the term “trademark” to include 
“any word, name, symbol, or device or any combination thereof: (1) 
used by a person or (2) which a person has a bona fide intention to use 
                                                 
21 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1141(n) (2006). 
5
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in commerce…to identify and distinguish his or her goods… from 
those manufactured or sold by others and to indicate the source of the 
goods, even if that source is unknown.”22 Under this definition, in 
order to qualify for protection a mark must be “distinctive.”23 In 
Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., the Second Circuit 
set forth the now well-known categories of marks: (1) generic, (2) 
descriptive, (3) suggestive, and (4) arbitrary or fanciful.24 Generic 
marks never merit protection; descriptive marks are only protectable 
with proof of secondary meaning or acquired distinctiveness; 
suggestive and arbitrary or fanciful marks are protectable without 
proof of secondary meaning.25 A mark achieves secondary meaning 
when, after being introduced to the market, unknown to consumers, 
the products catches on and the mark comes to be uniquely associated 
with the original source.26 
The Abercrombie spectrum indicates a progressive degree of 
distinctiveness and therefore a concomitant increase in the strength of 
a mark.27 Arbitrary and fanciful marks are on one end and generic 
marks on the other. A mark owner is “better off adopting a fanciful or 
arbitrary mark” where they have yet to achieve the brand popularity 
level of someone like Nike.28 By not adopting a mark that is merely 
descriptive, a mark owner need not prove that the mark has acquired 
secondary meaning in the minds of the relevant buying public.29 It is 
easier to gain protection in the first instance and gives the mark owner 
time to develop consumer recognition through promotion and 
                                                 
22 Id. at § 1127. 
23 Wal-Mart Stores v. Samara, Bros., 529 U.S. 205, 210-216 (2001) (discussing 
distinctiveness in the context of trade dress protection). 
24 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 1976). 
25 Id. at 9-11. 
26 Custom Vehicles, Inc. v. Forest River, Inc., 476 F.3d 481, 483-484 (7th Cir. 
2007); see also 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f) (“…nothing in this chapter shall prevent the 
registration of a mark used by the applicant which has become distinctive of the 
applicant's goods in commerce…”). 
27 American Society of Plumbing Engineers v. TMB Pub., Inc., 109 Fed. Appx. 
781,789 n.9 (7th Cir. 2004). 
28 Custom Vehicles, 476 F.3d 481 at 484 (7th Cir. 2007). 
29 Id.  
6
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investment. On other hand, refusing protection for generic marks 
ensures that typical words are not monopolized. 
 
A. Commercial Use and Acquisition of Trademark Rights 
 
Once a mark has met the statutory definition of a trademark by 
obtaining the requisite degree of distinctiveness the mark owner must 
meet the second requirement for registration: use in commerce.30 The 
distinctiveness and commercial use requirements are closely related: 
the more a mark is used in commerce the more likely the mark is to be 
viewed as distinctive of the registrant’s goods. The commercial use 
requirement is tied to Congress’ ability to regulate trademarks in the 
first instance: the power to regulate trademarks arises out of the 
Commerce Clause of the Constitution.31 
There are two methods of registration.32 First, a mark owner who 
has already begun use of the mark in commerce may file an 
application for registration.33 Second, a person who has yet to use the 
mark in commerce, but has a bona fide intent to use the mark in 
commerce, may file an intent to use application (“ITU”).34 Where a 
person files an ITU application it must be followed up with proof of 
actual use of the mark in commerce within six months of the date of 
filing.35 Filing an ITU application establishes priority as of the date of 
                                                 
30 15 U.S.C. § 1051. 
31 See The Trademark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 94-95 (1879) (distinguishing 
between Congress’s express power to regulate patent and copyright under Article I, 
Section 8 and the power to regulate trademarks as falling only under the Commerce 
Clause); see also 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (defining commerce as “all commerce which 
may lawfully be regulated”).  
32 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051(a), 1051(b).  
33 Id. at § 1051(a).  
34 Id. at § 1051(b) (“(1) A person who has a bona fide intention … to use a 
trademark in commerce may request registration … (3) The statement shall … 
specify-- (A) that the person making the verification believes that he or she… [is] be 
entitled to use the mark in commerce…”). 
35 Id. at § 1051(d).  
7
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filing (except as against those already using the mark) and thus serves 
as a “place-holder.”36  
Under the Lanham Act, the term “use in commerce” means the 
“bona fide use of a mark in the ordinary course of trade, and not made 
merely to reserve a right in a mark.”37 This definition represents an 
effort on behalf of Congress to eliminate what was known as the 
“token use” of a trademark, or, minor acts or sales made to meet the 
threshold commercial use requirement in order to register the mark, 
maintain the mark, or to even prevent others from adopting the mark.38 
As evidenced by the aforementioned requirements, although 
trademark rights are established through use, not by virtue of 
registration,39 federal registration remains desirable because it endows 
additional benefits not provided at common law including: (1) 
nationwide constructive notice of the use and ownership of the mark; 
(2) original jurisdiction in federal courts based on federal question 
jurisdiction for actions concerning the mark; (3) prima facie evidence 
of the validity of the mark; (4) the right to use the mark nationally; (5) 
the right to use the mark; (6) the assistance of customs officials in 
policing the importation products bearing infringing marks.40   
Thus, in litigation, favorable presumptions of validity, ownership, 
and the exclusive right to use the mark attach where a registered mark 
is at issue.41 The Seventh Circuit has noted, however, that the 
evidentiary value of a certificate of registration may be one of minor 
                                                 
36 Zazu Designs v. L'Oreal, S.A., 979 F.2d 499, 503 (7th Cir. 1992). 
37 15 U.S.C. § 1127.  
38  See Paramount Pictures Corp. v. White, 31 U.S.P.Q.2d 1768, 1774 (T.T.A.B 
1994); see also The Trademark Law Revision Act, Public Law 100-667 (1988). 
39 See In re ECCS, Inc., 94 F.3d 1578, 1579 (Fed.Cir.1996); see also In re Int’l 
Flavors & Fragrances, Inc., 183 F.3d 1362, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“The federal 
registration of a trademark does not create an exclusive property right in the mark”). 
40 America Online, Inc. v. AT&T Corp., 243 F.3d 812, 818 (4th Cir. 2001); see 
also 15 U.S.C. §§ 1072, 1121, 1115, 1072, 1111, and 1125(b). 
41 15 U.S.C. § 1115.  
8
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significance because the presumption is an easily rebuttable one.42 It 
“merely shifts the burden of production to the alleged infringer.”43 
 
B. Commercial Use and Priority Contests 
 
Commercial use is also relevant to establishing priority among 
competing claimants of trademark rights. “Priority contests” arise 
where two or more parties allege prior use, and thus, valid rights in, 
the same trademark for similar products or services.44 The first date of 
commercial use serves as a guidepost to determining who has better 
rights, or, priority, in the mark. The first party to use a mark is 
generally considered the “senior” user and is entitled to enjoin the 
“junior” user from using the same, or a confusingly similar, mark.45 
The senior user receives priority over the junior user and has the 
power to enjoin the junior user from using the mark on the same or 
related goods. Further, the scope of protection enjoyed by a trademark 
owner is not restricted to the original owner’s use of the mark. The 
“natural expansion” doctrine allows that owner to extend the scope of 
its protection for products the mark was originally used, but also 
related product lines.46 Under this doctrine, the senior trademark 
owner’s rights are limited to those goods that have been used and 
those related to the original goods, but also those that lie within the 
realm of natural expansion.47 Accordingly, commercial use has 
repercussions for a trademark owner’s use of the mark when faced 
with others using the mark on the same products, but also other 
products so long as they are related to the original.  
                                                 
42 Custom Vehicles, Inc. v. Forest River, Inc., 476 F.3d 481, 486 (7th Cir. 
2007). 
43 Id. (citing Door Systems, Inc. v. Pro-Line Door Systems, Inc., 83 F.3d 169, 
172 (7th Cir.1996)); see also KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, 
Inc., 408 F.3d 596, 604 (9th Cir. 2005). 
44 See J. Thomas McCarthy, 3 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR 
COMPETITION § 20:17 (4th Ed.)(2007). 
45 Id. at § 16:5 (discussing the nature of the senior users market and the “zone 
of natural expansion” doctrine).  
46 Id. 
47 Id. 
9
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C. Commercial Use, Trademark Warehousing, and Policy Implications 
 
The commercial use requirement also prevents mark owners from 
warehousing and hoarding trademarks.48 As Judge Posner of the 
Seventh Circuit recently explained in Custom Vehicles, Inc. v. Forest 
River: 
 
Bare registration is not enough. Trademarks cannot be 
“banked” or “warehoused”- that is, you cannot register 
thousands of names, unrelated to any product or service 
that you sell, in the hope of extracting a license fee from 
sellers of products or services for which one of your names 
might be apt.49 
 
When trademarks are warehoused they do not serve the principle 
policies that form the very basis for trademark protection: protecting 
consumers, protecting trademark owner’s investments in their mark, 
and protecting and fostering fair competition.  
Trademark law protects consumers from confusion between 
brands in the marketplace and also allows consumers to distinguish 
between competing products.50 The law functions to prevent confusion 
by reserving protection only for marks that are distinctive of the goods 
or services of the mark owner. Because others are prohibited from 
using the mark on the same or similar goods, consumers are 
guaranteed that the products they buy originate with the same source, 
                                                 
48 Imperial Tobacco, Ltd. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 899 F.2d 1575, 1581 
(Fed.Cir.1990) (“The Lanham Act was not intended to provide a warehouse for 
unused marks”). 
49 Custom Vehicles, Inc. v. Forest River, Inc., 476 F.3d 481, 485 (7th Cir. 
2007) (citing Harrods Ltd. v. Sixty Internet Domain Names, 302 F.3d 214, 219 (4th 
Cir. 2002)). 
50 See Graham B. Dinwoodie & Mark D. Janis, Confusion Over Use: 
Contextualism In Trademark Law, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1597, 1613 (2007) (“Once 
consumer understanding, and hence a trademark right, is established, the primary 
goal of trademark law is to protect the integrity of that understanding by minimizing 
consumer confusion.”). 
10
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thus preventing consumer confusion. If a mark is not used, the 
consuming public cannot make the necessary link between the mark 
and a specific product.51 Thus, hoarding prevents other producers from 
making rightful use of a mark and inhibits the creation of real 
connections between products and their sources.  
These connections not only assist consumers in making 
purchasing decision by distinguishing among competing brands, but 
also function to reduce consumer search costs.52 Trademarks serve as 
source-identifiers by furnishing information about a products source, 
quality, and other important characteristics in a quick and costless 
fashion. This phenomenon is referred to as the reduction of “consumer 
search costs.”53 When a consumer makes a connection between a 
product or service in terms of price, quality, or the sheer image of life-
style a consumer wishes to exude54, the trademark becomes something 
they can rely on time and again to assist them in making their 
purchasing decisions. Thus, consumer “search costs” are reduced due 
to the ease by which a consumer chooses a product based upon the 
association of the mark with the product and its source.55 Neither of 
the aforementioned consumer-related policies of trademark law could 
be fulfilled without the commercial use requirement. Mark hoarding 
minimizes the communication between the consumer, the mark, and 
the producer. Hence, consumers lose meaningful and valuable 
information that they may use in making purchasing decisions. 
Trademark law also functions to protect trademark producers. The 
law protects the trademark owners’ rightful use from appropriation by 
others. The law bans pirating use by others who may create and sell 
products or market services of sub-standard quality. Protection 
promotes and rewards investment by preserving the value of marks by 
                                                 
51 See, e.g. Panavision Int’l., L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1325 (9th Cir. 
1998).  
52 See Stephen L. Carter, The Trouble With Trademark, 99 YALE  L.J. 759, 759 
(1990) (“Successful marks are like packets of information. They lower consumer 
search costs, thus promoting the efficient functioning of the market.”). 
53 See generally George J. Stigler, The Economics of Information, 69 
J.POL.ECON. 213 (1961). 
54 Ty Inc. v. Perryman, 306 F.3d 509, 510 (7th Cir. 2002). 
55 Id. at 510-511. 
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prohibiting others from using the mark. By prohibiting others from 
free-loading off of the good-will a mark has established producers and 
owners are rewarded for investing time, effort, and money in 
producing and developing new brands with corresponding new 
products. Thus, producers and owners are rewarded for creation and 
use by receiving the protection the law affords them in exchange. 
Trademark owners are also rewarded with continued patronage and 
brand loyalty, when they have made efficient use of their marks. As 
noted above, trademarks reduce consumer search costs, thereby 
increasing the ability and perhaps frequency of repeat purchasers. The 
use in commerce requirement is a necessary tradeoff for these benefits 
to accrue to the mark owner. In theory, if they do not use the marks in 
commerce they will not benefit financially from the trademark 
registration. Thus, it is always in their best interest to market and 
promote their mark as much as possible and to create quality goods 
associated with the mark in order to increase sales and brand loyalty.  
The commercial use requirement also functions to protect and 
promote fair and honest competition between businesses. Commercial 
use prevents trademark hoarding, thereby discouraging the artificial 
reservation and depletion of the trademark reservoir. In exchange for 
protection, mark owners are permitted to appropriate a term. The 
trademark rights scenario inherently impairs competition by 
“impeding the ability of competitors to indicate that their brands are in 
the same product space.”56 By forcing registrants to actually use marks 
or lose them trademark law grants producers freedom to pick and 
choose terms to accurately describe products and services, unless 
someone has already adopted and made valid, fair use of the term 
before them. Furthermore, innocent trademark adopters are protected 
from trademark trolls threatening license or litigation. Confident that 
the law only protects registrants who make valid commercial use of 
their mark producers need not heed to such demands. 
Accordingly, the commercial use requirement forms the very core 
of the fundamental policies trademark law was designed to protect. 
                                                 
56 Custom Vehicles, Inc. v. Forest River, Inc., 476 F.3d 481, 485 (7th Cir. 
2007). 
12
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Consumers, trademark owners, and competition all directly benefit by 
vigilant enforcement of the use in commerce requirement. 
 
II. CONSEQUENCES OF FAILURE TO USE MARK IN COMMERCE 
 
The failure to use a mark in commerce may arise in two contexts: 
in inter-partes proceedings before the United State Patent and 
Trademark Office (“USPTO”) and when raised as a collateral attack in 
litigation. The Lanham Act gives concurrent power to order the 
cancellation of a mark to the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board 
(“TTAB”) and the courts.57 In either context, the non-use of a mark 
may be challenged on grounds of abandonment or a user may allege 
use of the mark prior to the date of registration thereby creating a 
priority contest.58 A party may file a petition to cancel a trademark 
directly with the USPTO subject to certain restrictions as explained 
supra in Section B.59 One can also challenge the validity of a mark and 
request a court to order its cancellation during trademark litigation.60 
 
A. Commercial Use and Grounds for Cancellation 
 
In some cases, 15 U.S.C. § 1064 of the Lanham Act acts as five-
year statute of limitations on an opponent’s ability to challenge a 
mark.61 Marks that have been registered for less than five years may be 
cancelled “for any reason which would have been sufficient to deny 
registration in the first instance.”62 This limit applies to claims that 
there was no bona fide use of the mark in commerce to support the 
                                                 
57 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1067, 1119. 
58 Id. at § 1064 (setting forth grounds for cancellation). 
59 Id. at § 1064. 
60 Id. at §§ 1119, 1067. 
61 Id. at § 1154. 
62 Id. at §§ 1064, 1071(b)(1); Int’l. Order of Jobs Daughters v. Lindeburg & 
Co., 727 F.2d 1087, 1091 (Fed. Cir. 1984); see also McCarthy, supra note 44, at § 
20:52.  
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original registration.63 However, a mark may always be challenged on 
the grounds that it has been abandoned regardless of how long a mark 
has been registered.64 
During the hypothetical priority contest, a party will inevitably 
invoke § 1052(d), which states that a trademark may not be registered 
if it “consists of or comprises a mark which so resembles” a mark 
“previously used in the U.S. by another and not abandoned, as to be 
likely, when used on or in connection with the goods of the applicant, 
to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive . . . .”65 Where a 
party realizes that a mark they have been using is the same or 
confusingly similar to a mark on the register they may have cause to 
file a petition to cancel that mark if the party’s date of first use is 
before that of the registrant.66 In this context, the first step to establish 
priority is to demonstrate a date of use prior to that of the registrant.67 
The second step is proving likelihood of confusion, assessed under the 
TTAB’s likelihood of confusion factors, which includes the 
similarities between the marks and the similarities between the goods 
or services in which the mark is used.68 If these two elements are met, 
                                                 
63 15 U.S.C. § 1064; see also Jonathon Hudis, Beginning An Inter Partes 
Proceedings Before The Trademark Trial and Appeal Board: Nature, Grounds, and 
Initial Pleadings, 890 PLI/Pate 103 at 117 (2007). 
64 15 U.S.C. § 1064. Other challenges that are not subject to the five year 
statute of limitations includes claims that: (1) the mark has become generic; (2) the 
mark is functional; (3) the mark was obtained fraudulently; (4) that the mark 
misrepresents its source; (5) that the mark was obtained contrary to the provisions of 
§ 1064, which sets forth the standards for registering “collective” and “certification” 
marks; or (6) that the mark . . . is comprised of, among other things . . . immoral, 
deceptive, or scandalous matter. 
65 Id. at § 1052.  
66 See e.g. Ford Motor Co. v. Ford, 462 F.2d 1405 (C.C.P.A. 1972), cert. 
denied, 409 U.S. 1109 (1973) (cancelling “Ford Records” registration because of 
likelihood of confusion with Ford Motor Company’s trademark “Ford”); Southern 
Enters., Inc. v. Burger King of Florida, Inc., 419 F.2d 460 (C.C.P.A. 1970) 
(cancelling “Whoppaburger” registration because of likelihood of confusion with 
Burger King’s “Whopper” trademark”).  
67 Hudis, supra note 63, at 120. 
68 Id; see also In re E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361 
(C.C.P.A. 1972) (setting forth factors relevant to likelihood of confusion analysis).  
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that party will likely be deemed the “senior” user and the registrant the 
“junior” user and the junior user’s registered mark should be cancelled 
pursuant to § 1052(d).  
On the other hand, a more direct consequence of the failure to 
make bona fide use of a mark in commerce arises in the context of a 
claim of abandonment. Pursuant to § 1127, a trademark has been 
abandoned where use has been discontinued with the intent not to 
resume.69 Thus, the existence of abandonment is a two prong inquiry: 
(1) there must be a period of non-use and (2) the user must also intend 
not to resume that use.70 Intent may be inferred from the 
circumstances.71 It is also a question of fact.72 Non-use of a trademark 
for three consecutive years constitutes prima facie evidence of 
abandonment.73 The effect of this prima facie case is to eliminate the 
challenger’s burden to establish the element of intent.74 Thus, it shifts 
the burden of producing evidence to rebut the presumption of intent to 
abandon to the plaintiff or trademark owner.75 A claim of abandonment 
may be the basis of a cancellation proceeding in the TTAB or may be 
asserted as an affirmative defense to litigation. 
 
B. Cancellation and Inter-Partes Proceedings Before the U.S. Patent 
and Trademark Office 
 
The TTAB has jurisdiction over four types of inter partes 
proceedings: oppositions, cancellations, interferences, and concurrent 
                                                 
69 Id. at § 1127 
70 Id.; see also McCarthy, supra note 44, at § 17:9.  
71 15 U.S.C. § 1127; see also M. L. Cross, Abandonment of a Trademark or 
Tradename, 3 A.L.R.2d 1226 (2007) (recognizing that intent is most often presumed 
from the circumstances because rarely do mark owners expressly indicate their intent 
to abandon a mark); see also FirstHealth of Carolinas, Inc. v. CareFirst of Maryland, 
Inc.  479 F.3d 825, 830 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“abandonment is a question of fact”).  
72 FirstHealth of Carolinas, Inc., 479 F.3d 825 at 830. 
73 15 U.S.C. § 1127. 
74 Imperial Tobacco, Ltd. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 899 F.2d 1575, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 
1990). 
75 Id. at 1579. 
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use proceedings.76 Cancellation proceedings may be initiated by any 
person who believes that they are or will be damaged by a registered 
mark.77 An inter partes proceedings before the TTAB is similar to 
district court proceedings in that there are pleadings, motions, 
discovery and brief filing.78 They differ, however, because the TTAB is 
an administrative tribunal and thus, proceedings are conducted solely 
in writing.79 A party to a proceedings may never even come before the 
board, by way of giving witness testimony or otherwise, unless a party 
requests oral hearing on the matter.80  
Although the failure to petition for cancellation over a long period 
of time will not preclude a party from raising cancellation as a defense 
to an infringement suit brought by the registrant81, that failure may 
“smack tactical afterthoughts” to a court in later proceedings.82 Thus, 
where one doubts the validity of a registration it is always the better 
course to petition to cancel the mark rather than adopting a “wait and 
see” approach.83 Although hindsight is twenty-twenty, there are major 
benefits to filing a petition to cancel, aside from the obvious proactive 
avoidance of being placed in the defending position in litigation. First, 
an inter partes proceeding is doubtlessly less costly than the assertion 
of either priority or abandonment as an affirmative defense in 
litigation. Second, an inter partes proceeding is a less time-consuming 
endeavor. Although it is arguable that the TTAB is just as backlogged 
                                                 
76 See Hudis, supra note 63, at 111; see also 15 U.S.C. §§ 1063, 1064, 1092.  
77 A person may oppose the registration of a mark shown in pending 
application pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1063 and may also petition for cancellation of a 
mark post-registration pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1064. 
78 See Trademark Trial and Appeal Board Manual of Procedure (hereinafter 
“TBMP”), Chapter 102.02, 2d Ed., 1st Rev. (March 12, 2004) accessible at: 
http://www.uspto.gov/go/dcom/ttab (USPTO rules governing the procedures are 
designed to approximate the proceedings in a courtroom trial)). 
79 Id. at Chapter 102.02. 
80 Id.  
81 Central Manufacturing Inc. v. Brett, 2005 WL 2445898 *1, 6 n.5 (N.D. Ill. 
Sept. 30, 2005) aff’d, 492 F.3d 876, 880 (7th Cir. 2007). 
82 See McCarthy, supra note 44, at § 30:109. 
83 Id.  
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as the district courts, the average time is much less than that of 
litigation. 
Further, where a party receives an adverse decision from the 
TTAB, that party is entitled to appeal. A party may appeal a decision 
of the TTAB to either the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 
or to a federal district court.84 In an appeal to the Federal Circuit, the 
case proceeds on the closed administrative record and no new 
evidence is permitted.85 In contrast, an appeal to the district court is 
both an appeal and a new action, which allows the parties to request 
additional relief and to submit new evidence.86 The courts of appeals, 
other than the Federal Circuit, have appellate jurisdiction to review the 
district court's decision.87  
 
C. Cancellation and Litigation 
 
The power to cancel a trademark is not limited to the USPTO. As 
Judge Easterbrook has noted, “trademark law does not reserve the 
cancellation power to the PTO. A court may cancel a mark itself or 
order the agency to do so.”88 The power to order the cancellation of a 
mark is governed by 15 U.S.C. § 1119.89 That section provides: “In 
any action involving a registered mark the court may determine the 
right to registration, order the cancellation of registrations, in whole or 
in part, restore cancelled registrations, and otherwise rectify the 
register with respect to the registrations of any party to the action.”90 
The “net effect” of 15 U.S.C § 1119 is to give the courts “concurrent 
                                                 
84 15 U.S.C § 1071; see also CAE, Inc. v. Clean Air Engineering, Inc. 267 F.3d 
660, 673 (7th Cir. 2001); see also McCarthy, supra note 44, at §§ 21:20, 21:25, 
21:26. 
85 15 U.S.C. § 1071(a)(4); see also CAE, Inc., 267 F.3d at 660. 
86 CAE, Inc., 267 F.3d at 660 (citing Spraying Sys. Co. v. Delavan, Inc., 975 
F.2d 387, 390 (7th Cir.1992)); see also McCarthy, supra note 44, at § 21:20. 
87 15 U.S.C. § 1121(a). 
88 Ruth Foundation v. World Church of the Creator, 297 F.3d 662, 665 (7th Cir. 
2002).  
89 15 U.S.C. § 1119; see also Ruth Foundation, 297 F.3d at 665.  
90 Ruth Foundation, 297 F.3d at 665. 
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power” with the USPTO to conduct cancellation proceedings.91 The 
Supreme Court has noted that § 1119 grants the court “broad power” 
to order the cancellation of a registered mark."92 
Unlike inter partes procedures before the TTAB, cancellation of a 
trademark cannot be the only basis of a plaintiff’s suit.93 The Seventh 
Circuit has held that federal courts do not have jurisdiction to hear a 
claim for cancellation brought by a plaintiff without a current 
registration.94 The reasoning for this stems from the language of the 
Lanham Act and policy implications. First, the plain language of 15 
U.S.C. § 1119 states that the court may order cancellation “in any 
action involving a registered mark” and 15 U.S.C. § 1121 grants 
jurisdiction to the federal courts “of all actions arising under this 
Act.”95 Thus, where a registered mark is not involved a plaintiff may 
not invoke the jurisdictional grants of the Lanham Act.96 Second, “if 
one could file suit in federal court solely for cancellation of a 
registration, this would undercut and short-circuit the power of the 
[TTAB].”97 Thus, some other ground for jurisdiction must exist to 
invoke the federal jurisdiction of the federal courts, but, theoretically, 
diversity alone would suffice.98  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
91 15 U.S.C. § 1119; see also McCarthy, supra note 44, at § 30:109.  
92 Park’n Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park and Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 213 (1985). 
93 See Jasin R. Berne, Court Intervention But Not In Classic Form: A Survey of 
Remedies in Internet Trademark Cases, 43 ST. LOUIS U.L.J. 1157, 1167 (1999).  
94 Homemakers, Inc. v. Chicago Home for Friendless, 313 F.Supp 1087, 1087 
(N.D. Ill 1970), aff’d, 169 U.S.P.Q. 262 (7th Cir. 1971).  
95 15 U.S.C. § 1121; see also id. at § 1338(a).  
96 See McCarthy, supra note 44, at § 30:110. 
97 Id. 
98 See, e.g. Simmonds Aerocessories, Ltd. v. Elastic Stop Nut Corp., 257 F.2d 
485,486 (3d Cir. 1958) (diversity jurisdiction); but see Sam S. Goldstein Industries, 
Inc. v. Botany Industries, Inc., 301 F. Supp. 728, 730 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).  
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III. CENTRAL MANUFACTURING, INC. V. BRETT: CANCELLATION OF THE 
STEALTH MARK AND THE “EXCEPTIONAL” CASE 
 
On April 29, 2004, Stealth Industries, later amended to include 
Central Manufacturing, Inc. and Leo Stoller99, filed suit against George 
Brett and Brett Brothers Sports International, Inc., seeking an 
injunction and damages for the defendant’s improper use of the 
“STEALTH” mark on baseball bats in the U.S. District Court for the 
Northern District of Illinois.100 
In response, the defendants asserted thirteen affirmative defenses, 
three of which are relevant to this comment: (1) unenforceability due 
to invalid or void registrations; (2) abandonment due to failure to use 
the mark in connection with the plaintiff’s business; and (3) non-
infringement due to the defendant’s use of the mark prior to the 
plaintiff’s.101 In filing their motion for summary judgment, the 
defendant argued that the plaintiff failed to meet his burden of 
producing evidence that would create a genuine issue of material fact 
for trial for three reasons. First, the plaintiff could not show actual use 
of the mark on goods sold to the public before the defendant’s first use 
of the mark, despite the existence of a federal registration.102 Second, 
even if the registration was valid in the first instance, the plaintiff’s 
lack of commercial use constituted an abandonment of the mark.103 
Third, there could be no likelihood of confusion between the parties 
use of the marks because confusion cannot arise in the absence of 
use.104 Finally, the defendant asked the court to order the cancellation 
                                                 
99 See Defendants' Answer and Affirmative Defenses to Plaintiff's Amended 
Complaint, 2004 WL 2817117 (N.D. Ill., Sep. 2, 2004) (Stoller is the President and 
sole shareholder of STEALTH Industries, Inc. and Central Mfg. Co.). 
100 Central Manufacturing Inc. v. Brett, 2005 WL 2445898 *1, 1 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 
30, 2005) aff’d, 492 F.3d 876, 880 (7th Cir. 2007). 
101 See Defendants' Answer and Affirmative Defenses to Plaintiff's Amended 
Complaint, 2004 WL 2817117 (N.D. Ill., Sep. 2, 2004). 
102 Id. 
103 Id; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1127. 
104 See Defendants' Answer and Affirmative Defenses, 2004 WL 2817117 (N.D. 
Ill., Sep. 2, 2004). The Seventh Circuit’s likelihood of confusion analysis involves 
the application of the following factors: (1) the similarity of the marks in appearance 
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of the plaintiff’s ‘249 registration of the STEALTH mark.105 The 
defendant did not mention 15 U.S.C. § 1119, which is the section of 
the Lanham Act that actually gives the court concurrent authority with 
the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) to order the 
cancellation of the mark.106 Instead, the defendant argued that the ’249 
registration should be cancelled pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d), 
which merely recites the grounds for ordering the cancellation of the 
mark.107 However, this distinction is one without much significance. 
The court still invoked its authority pursuant to that section. After 
analyzing each of the defendant’s arguments in turn, on September 30, 
2005, Judge Coar of the Northern District of Illinois granted the 
defendant’s motion for summary judgment and ordered the 
cancellation of the plaintiff’s ‘249 registration.108   
First, the court addressed the validity of the plaintiff’s trademark, 
setting forth the two requirements that a plaintiff must demonstrate in 
order to prove up a claim of trademark infringement: (1) ownership of 
a valid trademark and (2) the infringement of that mark.109 In assessing 
the validity of the plaintiffs’ trademark, the court held that despite the 
presumption of validity that a trademark registration provides, the 
plaintiffs failed to provide sufficient evidence of use of the mark in 
                                                                                                                   
and suggestion; (2) the similarity of the products; (3) the area and manner of 
concurrent use; (4) the degree of care likely to be used by consumers; (5) the 
strength of the plaintiff's mark; (6) whether any actual confusion exists; and (7) the 
defendant's intent to palm off its goods as those of the plaintiffs. See Helene Curtis 
Industries, Inc. v. Church & Dwight Co., Inc, 560 F.2d 1325, 1330 (7th Cir. 1977).  
105 See Defendants' Answer and Affirmative Defenses, 2004 WL 2817117 (N.D. 
Ill., Sep. 2, 2004)(The defendant’s invoked 15 U.S.C.§§ 1064 and 1068, which 
provide that a mark may be cancelled if it would cause confusion with a previously 
existing mark, stating, “[b]ecause it is undisputed that Brett Bros, use of ‘Stealth’ for 
baseball bats pre-dates Stoller's alleged use and the goods contained in Stoller's ′249 
registration (‘baseball, softball and t-ball bats,’) are similar to Brett Bros’ “Stealth” 
mark, there is clearly a likelihood of confusion between the marks”).  
106 Id.  
107 Id. 
108 Id. at *1. 
109 Id. at *5. 
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commerce.110 Thus, the plaintiffs could not, and did not, own the mark 
“STEALTH” for baseballs or baseball bats.111  
 
A. The Priority Contest: Evidentiary Proof of Commercial Use 
 
Central Manufacturing was a classic priority contest. The 
defendants first began using the STEALTH mark on baseball bats and 
sold them in commerce in 1999.112 The defendant’s STEALTH 
baseball bat has been recognized by the Little League Baseball 
Association and the Major League Baseball Association.113 To this day, 
the defendant continues to sell its STEALTH bats online and at various 
retail outlets.114  
The plaintiff, on the other hand, claimed that his first use of the 
STEALTH mark on baseball related products was in at least 1982.115 
As noted above, although the plaintiff claimed to be either the 
registrant or assignee of “33 federally registered STEALTH or 
STEALTH formative marks,” only two were conceivably relevant to 
this suit.116 This is due to the likelihood of confusion requirement: only 
the use of a mark that is likely to cause consumer confusion is 
actionable.117 Thus, the plaintiff invoked two registrations for products 
related to baseball rather than invoking the STEALTH registrations on 
wholly unrelated products. The first registration occurred on August 
29, 1984 when the plaintiff registered the STEALTH mark for 
“sporting goods, specifically, tennis rackets, golf clubs, tennis balls, 
basketballs, soccer balls, golf balls, cross bows, tennis racket strings 
                                                 
110 Id. 
111 Id.  
112 Id. 
113 Id. at *2. 
114 See Brett Brothers Home Page, http://www.brettbats.com (last visited Jan. 3, 
2008). 
115 Central Manufacturing, Inc. v. Brett, 2005 WL 2445898, *1, 3 (N.D. Ill. 
Sept. 30, 2005) aff’d, 492 F.3d 876, 880 (7th Cir. 2007). 
116 Id. at *2.  
117 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A).  
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and shuttle cocks” (the “‘378 Registration”).118 On February 9, 2002, 
the plaintiff registered the STEALTH mark for “baseball, softball, T-
ball bats,” (“the ‘249 Registration”).119 The ‘249 Registration’s first 
use date of the STEALTH mark for baseball bats was January 3, 
2001.120  
The court noted that it was undisputed that the plaintiff acquired a 
registration for the use of the word “STEALTH” with respect to 
baseballs in 1984 (the ‘378 Registration), but equally clear was the 
fact that the plaintiffs did not acquire a registration for the use of the 
STEALTH mark in relation to baseball bats until 2004 (the ‘249 
Registration).121 Thus, if adequate proof existed for the continuous 
commercial use of the STEALTH mark on baseball related products 
from the date of the first registration, the plaintiff would have priority 
over the defendant’s use of the mark.122 However, the plaintiffs “failed 
completely to support their claim that they actually used the 
STEALTH mark in connection with an established, presently existing, 
and ongoing business prior to [defendant’s] use of the word STEALTH 
on baseball bats in 1999.”123 The court found it incredulous that the 
plaintiff, who claimed to have used the mark for more than a decade, 
could not provide a sole invoice indicating any commercial transaction 
involving the sale of any baseball-related product under the STEALTH 
mark.124 The defendant, however, easily demonstrated that they began 
selling baseball bats on their website in 1999 – nearly five years before 
                                                 
118 See United States Trademark Registration No. 1,332,378 (filed August 29, 
1984) (cancelled June 26, 2007).  
119 See United States Trademark Registration No. 2,892,249 (filed February 1, 
2007) (cancelled June 26, 2007).  
120 Id.  
121 Central Manufacturing Inc. v. Brett, 2005 WL 2445898 *1, 3 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 
30, 2005) aff’d, 492 F.3d 876, 880 (7th Cir. 2007). 
122 This would only be the case if the court found that the use of the STEALTH 
marks on baseball bats was confusingly similar to the plaintiff’s use of the 
STEALTH marks on baseballs. This argument was only made in the alternative by 
the parties at the district court level because they simply attacked the validity of the 
plaintiffs claim to the trademark in the first place under grounds of priority and 
abandonment. 
123 Central Manufacturing, Inc., 2005 WL 2445898 at *5.  
124 Id.  
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the 249’ Registration.125 Accordingly, the court found that the 
defendant could not infringe because they were the “senior” users to 
the mark.126 Thus, the defendants were the parties with valid ownership 
rights in the STEALTH mark for baseball bats by virtue of their prior 
use.127  
Central Manufacturing illustrates that the type and amount of 
evidence of commercial use can prove problematic for some plaintiffs. 
Stoller’s complete and utter lack of proof of commercial use represents 
the extreme case. But, what sort of evidence is sufficient to prove 
commercial use? What must a plaintiff show to demonstrate sufficient 
use in commerce to prove ownership of a valid and enforceable mark? 
If there were a commercial use spectrum, Central Manufacturing 
would be at the bottom of the evidentiary standard of proof. In 
characterizing the plaintiff’s proof as “unsupported assertions” and 
“unauthenticated evidence of small amounts of sales,” the court held 
the plaintiff failed to prove ownership rights to the STEALTH mark.128 
The most obvious problem was the lack of invoices and receipts 
characteristic of actual business transactions between the plaintiff and 
consumers or businesses.129 However, to support his claim of 
ownership the plaintiff attempted to admit the following documentary 
evidence: advertising material and charts of “sales” activity.130 The 
court rejected this evidence as unsubstantiated, unbelievable or both.  
First, in rejecting the plaintiff’s attempt to introduce a sporting 
goods magazine to prove “alleged licensee was active in the baseball 
market,” the court stated the law was clear that “mere advertising and 
documentary use of a notion apart from the goods do not constitute 
technical trademark use.131 Plaintiff also attempted to introduce an 
advertising flyer for a STEALTH baseball.132 Both were rejected 
                                                 
125 Id. at *13-15. 
126 Id. at *15. 
127 Id.  
128 Id. at *5. 
129 Id. 
130 Id. 
131 Id. (quoting Powermatics, Inc. v. Globe Roofing Prods. Co., 341 F.2d 127, 
130 (C.C.P.A. 1965)). 
132 Id. 
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because mere “marketing and promotional materials” alone are 
insufficient to constitute trademark use, particularly in the absence of 
evidence that the flyer was ever sent out to a potential customer nor 
resulted in a single sale of the bat.133 
Second, the plaintiff attempted to introduce “Sale Quote Sheets” 
and “Stealth Brand Baseball Sales”, but could not explain where the 
lump sum yearly numbers came from or to whom or where the alleged 
sales were made.134 The court stated that there was simply nothing in 
record to indicate that the “sales sheet[s] bear any relation to reality 
and is not simply something Plaintiffs generated on a home computer 
for the purposes of this litigation.”135 Further, there was no evidence 
that the “products ever existed except as lines on a piece of 
promotional paper or that any of these corporations ordered even one 
item from Plaintiffs.”136 The sales sheets also failed to overcome the 
mere advertising hurdle.137 Although the plaintiff testified at his 
deposition that he had sold baseball bats, the court refused to give 
credence to his self-serving deposition testimony.138   
The court did note that “registration, coupled with slight sales, 
establishes an exclusive right in the mark against junior users”, but 
here, there was absolutely no credible evidence of baseball related 
product sales to establish their exclusive right in the STEALTH mark 
for baseballs, much less for baseball bats.139  
So, what type of evidence is sufficient to establish commercial use 
for the purposes of ownership? The Seventh Circuit has stated that this 
determination is made on a case by case basis and upon consideration 
of the “totality of the circumstances.”140 Although the Ninth Circuit 
                                                 
133 Id.  
134 Id. 
135 Id. 
136 Id. 
137 Id.  
138 Id. at *3. 
139 Id. at *5. 
140 See, e.g., Johnny Blastoff, Inc. v. L.A. Rams Football Co., 188 F.3d 427, 
433 (7th Cir. 1999) (“The determination of whether a party has established 
protectable rights in a trademark is made on a case by case basis, considering the 
totality of the circumstances”). 
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has held that commercial use sufficient to establish ownership rights 
may be proven without evidence of a sale, the Seventh Circuit has not 
been so generous.141 
In Zazu Designs v. L’Oreal, S.A., the Seventh Circuit found 
evidence of a few sales of products to which the mark had been 
affixed insufficient to establish trademark ownership.142 In that case, 
the plaintiff hair salon had sold a few bottles of shampoo bearing the 
mark over the counter and via mail.143 The court found such limited 
sales “neither link the [mark] with [the plaintiff’s] product in the 
minds of consumers nor put other producers on notice.”144  
Just before Central Manufacturing was decided in 2007, the 
Seventh Circuit was presented with the opportunity to pass on another 
trademark case relating to the commercial use requirement. In Custom 
Vehicles, the court affirmed the decision of the Northern District of 
Indiana, dismissing a trademark infringement complaint of the alleged 
owner of the mark “Work-N-Play.”145 The court found that the mark 
was descriptive when used for a van that could be converted from an 
office to a camper, but more importantly, the court held that the sale of 
one van without using the trademark was insufficient to place the mark 
in use in commerce for the purposes of the Lanham Act.146 The 
plaintiffs had filed an intent-to-use application for the mark, however, 
that same year a much larger company started using the same mark in 
similar types of vans.147 The sales of the second company totaled more 
than $10 million whereas the plaintiff had made only one sale of its 
van and not even under the Work-N-Play mark.148 Judge Posner, 
writing for the court, first noted that even if the mark had been used in 
                                                 
141 Planetary Motion, Inc. v. Techsplosion, Inc., 261 F.3d 1188, 1195-1196 
(existence of sales or lack thereof does not by itself determine whether a user of a 
mark has established ownership rights therein). 
142 979 F.2d at 503-04. 
143 Id. at 503. 
144 Id. 
145 Custom Vehicles, Inc. v. Forest River, Inc., 476 F.3d 481, 482 (7th Cir. 
2007). 
146 Id. at 485. 
147 Id.  
148 Id.  
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the sale, it would not have been enough to place the trademark in the 
“ordinary course of trade.”149 The court then went on to state: “[w]e 
suppose that one sale of a $150 million airplane or yacht within the 
first six months might be sufficient use, for it would be enough to 
seize the attention of the relevant market.”150 
The court went on to acknowledge that the Ninth Circuit has held 
that “where a mark has been placed on goods, a single sale or 
shipment may be sufficient to support an application to register the 
mark” so long as that use is bona fide,” but the court declined to 
follow its reasoning.151 The court did note an exception for the 
“superexpensive prototype,” such as the yacht example noted above, 
where one sale may be sufficient to demonstrate commercial use, but 
“not one sale of a van.”152 This singular sale would be too “obscure an 
event to alert any significant number of consumers” as to the marks 
existence.153 
Thus, in assessing the commercial use requirement, the focus is 
on whether the mark was adopted and used in a manner sufficiently 
public to identify and distinguish the goods to likely consumers of 
those particular goods. De minimis use is not sufficient to meet this 
standard.154 Hence, slight sales of a product affixed with the mark will 
likely not meet the commercial use requirement. Accordingly, in the 
district courts governed by the Seventh Circuit, plaintiffs must be 
prepared to present actual and substantiated evidence of sales of the 
specific goods affixed with the mark in question before even 
contemplating filing suit for trademark infringement.  
The defendant’s alternative argument for a claim to priority was 
that the plaintiff abandoned the STEALTH mark.155 Although the 
                                                 
149 Id. (citing Lucent Information Management, Inc. v. Lucent Technologies, 
Inc., 186 F.3d 315-317 (3rd Cir. 1999)). 
150 Id. 
151 Id. at 485-486 (discussing Chance v. Pac-Tel Teletrac Inc., 242 F.3d 1151, 
1157 (9th Cir. 2001)). 
152 Id. at 485. 
153 Id.  
154 See McCarthy, supra note 44, at §16:6.  
155 Central Manufacturing Inc. v. Brett, 2005 WL 2445898 *1, 5 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 
30, 2005) aff’d, 492 F.3d 876, 880 (7th Cir. 2007). 
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district court already determined that the defendant was in fact the 
senior user, the court nevertheless engaged in an abandonment 
analysis, holding that the plaintiff’s complete inability to produce 
evidence of commercial use supported a finding of abandonment.156 
 
B. The District Court’s Ruling 
 
Finally, despite finding that the plaintiff failed its burden of 
proving the first prong of the trademark analysis, ownership of a valid 
mark, the court continued to apply the seven-factor likelihood of 
confusion test.157 Stoller argued that the ‘378 registration, although did 
not include baseball bats, was sufficiently strong and related to 
baseball bats to cause likelihood of confusion.158 The district court, 
however, found that the application of the likelihood of confusion test 
weighed overwhelmingly in the defendants favor.159 
After assessing the parties’ respective arguments, the district court 
granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment.160 In granting 
the defendant’s motion, the court also took two steps seemingly 
outside of the norm of trademark litigation: the court ordered the 
plaintiff to pay the defendant’s attorneys’ fees and costs and ordered 
the cancellation of the plaintiff’s 249’ registration.161  
First, by invoking the court’s power to order the cancellation of a 
mark pursuant to 15 U.S.C § 1119, the court went beyond what was 
absolutely required in order for justice to be served in this case. The 
defendant’s argued that because they were the senior users of the 
STEALTH mark, the plaintiff’s continued registration of the 
STEALTH mark for the same goods, baseball bats, violated 15 U.S.C. 
1052(d).162 This section states that a mark may be cancelled if it 
“[c]onsists of or comprises a mark which so resembles ... a mark or 
                                                 
156 Id. at *6. 
157 Id. at *9-13.  
158 Id. at *10. 
159 Id. 
160 Id. 
161 Id. 
162 Id. at *14. 
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trade name previously used in the United States by another and not 
abandoned, as to be likely, when used on or in connection with the 
goods of the applicant, to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to 
deceive.”163 Because the defendant’s were the first to use the 
STEALTH mark and the ‘249 Registration claimed baseball bats, the 
same goods the defendant’s sold using the mark, sufficiently 
likelihood of confusion justified cancellation of the ‘249 
registration.164 Accordingly, the district court ordered the cancellation 
of the ‘249 registration.165 Second, the award of attorney’s fees under 
the Lanham Act is reserved only for those “exceptional” cases; thus, it 
is unlikely that a court will award attorneys fees in trademark 
litigation. A discussion of the award of attorneys’ fees and costs is 
discussed in Section VI infra. 
The plaintiff appealed to the Seventh Circuit, challenging the 
district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendants, 
the cancellation of the plaintiff’s registration, and the award of 
attorney’s fees in costs.166  
 
V. CANCELLATION AS “BEST COURSE” AND THE “STINKING DEAD FISH” 
STANDARD FOR REVIEWING ATTORNEYS FEES: THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT 
APPROACH 
 
In affirming the district court’s decision regarding the plaintiff’s 
failure to prove valid commercial use of the mark, the Judge Evans, 
writing for the court, extensively quoted the district court’s analysis 
and rejection of the plaintiff’s evidence, or lack thereof, showing 
commercial use of the mark.167 In addressing the district court’s 
decision to cancel the plaintiff’s ‘249 registration, the court stated that 
“where… a registrant’s asserted rights to a mark are shown to be 
                                                 
163 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d).  
164 Central Manufacturing Inc. v. Brett, 2005 WL 2445898 *1,14 (N.D. Ill. 
Sept. 30, 2005) aff’d, 492 F.3d 876, 880 (7th Cir. 2007). 
165 Id. at *10. 
166 Central Manufacturing, Inc. v. Brett, 492 F.3d 876, 880 (7th Cir. 2007). 
167 Id. at 882-883. 
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invalid, cancellation is not merely appropriate, it is the best course.”168 
Finally, in upholding the district court’s award of attorney’s fees and 
costs the court eloquently noted that the court would “not reverse a 
determination [to award attorney’s fees and costs] for clear error 
unless it strikes us as wrong with the force of a 5-week-old, 
unrefrigerated, dead fish.”169 In applying this “olfactory standard” the 
court found that the only thing that stunk was the defendant’s actions 
in filing suit.170  
The issue of trademark cancellation arose by virtue of the 
defendant’s collateral attack on the validity of the STEALTH mark.171 
The defendants recognized the existence of two important facts in 
responding to the plaintiff’s complaint: they were truly the senior users 
of the STEALTH mark as used on baseball bats and the lack of 
evidence of commercial use also constituted an abandonment of the 
STEALTH mark.172 A district court is not required to order the 
cancellation of a mark where, as in Central Manufacturing, the mark 
is invalid. However, a court need not even wait for a party to request 
cancellation: cancellation is a purely optional and discretionary 
affirmative step taken on behalf of the court, either prompted by the 
alleged infringer’s response to the complaint or on the court’s own 
accord. Thus, when the validity of a mark is put in issue173, a court is 
faced with a to-cancel or not-to-cancel dilemma. The power to order 
the cancellation of a mark is an option often overlooked by many 
district courts. But, where a registrant-plaintiff clearly lacks rights to a 
mark, through the failure to commercially use the mark or otherwise, 
courts should be much more willing to invoke the power of 
                                                 
168 Id. at 883. 
169 Id.  
170 See Rodriguez v. Anderson, 973 F.2d 550, 553 (7th Cir. 1992) (describing 
this standard of review as an “olfactory” one).  
171 Central Manufacturing Inc. v. Brett, 2005 WL 2445898 *1, 14 -15 (N.D. Ill. 
Sept. 30, 2005) aff’d, 492 F.3d 876, 880 (7th Cir. 2007). 
172 Id. 
173 Id. at *14 (“The court may cancel a trademark in an action where the mark’s 
validity is placed in issue”).  
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cancellation, as the Seventh Circuit advocated in Central 
Manufacturing.174  
The Seventh Circuit not only approved of the district court’s 
invocation of its Section 1119 powers in cancelling the plaintiffs mark 
but also characterized the action as “not merely appropriate” but “the 
best course.”175 Accordingly, more courts should invoke their power to 
cancel in trademark litigation where it is obvious that the plaintiff’s 
trademark rights are invalid. This approach is supported not only by 
the statutory mandate of commercial use and Section 1119’s explicit 
grant of the power to cancel to the court, but also many important 
policy considerations. In Central Manufacturing the court itself noted 
two policies justifying this approach in its opinion. First, the court 
characterized the invocation of Section 1119 as putting “the public on 
notice of its trademark-related judgments.”176 Second, the court stated 
that Section 1119 “arms the court with the power to update the federal 
trademark register to account for a mark’s actual legal status (or lack 
thereof) after it has been adjudicated, thereby reducing the potential 
for future uncertainty over the rights in a particular mark.”177 Below, 
these policy implications are assessed. Finally, the Seventh Circuit’s 
unique characterization of its standard of review for attorney’s fees in 
Lanham cases warrants separate attention.178 
 
A. Certainty, Public Notice, and “Refreshing” Function 
 
The court first noted that a positive effect of the invocation of the 
power to cancel serves to “put the public on notice of its trademark-
related judgments.”179 Once there has been a final judgment either 
ordering or affirming an order to cancel and the proper procedures are 
followed, that mark is still present on the register, but its status is 
“cancelled.” Hence, when the court orders cancellation of a mark that 
                                                 
174 Central Manufacturing, Inc. v. Brett, 492 F.3d 876, 883 (7th Cir. 2007). 
175 Id. 
176 Id. 
177 Id.  
178 Id.  
179 Id.  
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has been abandoned due to non-use or has been invalided on the basis 
of priority, the court fulfills the goal of “rectifying the register” as set 
forth in Section 1119. This rectification is similar to hitting the refresh 
button on an internet webpage: once pressed the old data is discarded 
and only new data remains. Thus, the invocation of Section 1119 
cancellation serves an important gap-filling function: the USPTO has 
neither the resources nor the ability to police every mark on the 
register to assure that they are being used in commerce. The liberal use 
of Section 1119 serves as a judicial cleansing mechanism to produce a 
more updated and coherent register of marks that are actually used, 
thereby producing a more accurate picture for those searching for 
conflicts in their quest to adopt their own mark. Thus, judicial 
refreshment via Section 1119 puts the public on notice of trademark 
related judgments.  
 The court also posited that this refreshment mechanism also 
“reduces the potential for future uncertainly over the rights in a 
particular mark.”180 Cancellation results in the release of marks back 
into the marketplace for others to adopt and invest in. This also 
encourages healthy competition. Where the public is on notice of what 
marks or terms are monopolized for the purposes of adoption for 
specific goods or services, that public is on notice of what marks it can 
or cannot appropriate in the course of their own trademark 
development and adoption. The more often the register is refreshed, 
the more accurate picture trademark-seekers may have to assess 
trademark conflicts. Thus, new producers and hopeful mark owners 
may adopt words with ease and with confidence. 
 
B. Reduction of Trademark “Thickets” 
 
In addition to providing greater certainty by putting the public on 
notice of a marks status, ordering the cancellation of marks reduces 
trademark “thickets.” In Custom Vehicles, Judge Posner used the term 
“thicket” to describe a situation that would develop where, as here, 
trademark owners failed to use (or made commercially insignificant 
                                                 
180 Id.  
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use of) a registered mark.181 Trademark thickets “make it difficult for 
new producers to find suitable names for their products that had not 
already been appropriated to no worthier end than providing the 
premise for an infringement suit.”182 Further, “by insisting that firms 
use marks to obtain rights in them, the law prevents entrepreneurs 
from reserving brand names in order to make their rivals’ marketing 
more costly.”183 Thus, proper cancellation hinders the development of 
trademark thickets, thereby ensuring that words or marks are not 
depleted from the public arena and businesses are free to use and adopt 
them as their own. Unless a trademark registrant actually makes use of 
its mark in commerce, the seller should not be allowed to appropriate 
the mark, “denying its use to sellers who can actually sell.”184 
 
C. Deterring Trademark Troll and Long-Term Savings 
 
The liberal use of the power to cancel deters acts of trademark 
“trolls,” such as Stoller, who have failed to make legitimate use of 
their marks. This in turn results in long-term savings. Cancellation cuts 
off the presumptions associated with registration and thus may result 
in fewer cases filed by trademark trolls. The fewer frivolous trademark 
infringement suits that are filed, the fewer judicial recourses and time 
that are wasted. In Central Manufacturing, and every other case in 
which Leo Stoller had filed suit, the end result was the same: dismissal 
or a grant of summary judgment.  
In addition to deterring trademark trolls from filing suit, 
cancellation protects producers from the threat of suit and/or licensing 
demands for the use of a trademark that is no longer valid. In Central 
Manufacturing, for example, the plaintiff had “repeatedly sought ways 
to get around the law’s prohibition of stockpiling of unused marks, and 
this case is no different.”185 By cancelling the plaintiffs mark, the party 
                                                 
181 Custom Vehicles, Inc. v. Forest River, Inc., 476 F.3d 481, 485 (7th Cir. 
2007). 
182 Id. at 485. 
183 Zazu Designs v. L’Oreal, S.A., 979 F.2d 499, 503 (7th Cir. 1992). 
184 Custom Vehicles, Inc., 476 F.3d at 486. 
185 Id. 
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loses a valuable instrument in negotiation: the party no longer has a 
conceptually concrete basis for threatening to file suit. Where a 
registration is at issue, parties are much more likely to take the threat 
seriously than if only common law rights are asserted. Thus, the 
trademark troll loses an important bargaining chip when attempting to 
extort licensing fees from unsuspecting, innocent users of marks: the 
ability to claim ownership rights to, and presumptions associated with, 
registration of a trademark. 
 
D. Critiques 
 
The assumptions of long-term savings and deterrence as the result 
of cancellation is flawed for one important reason: because registration 
merely confers a presumption of the right to use, ownership, and 
validity, the loss of the registration results in only the loss of a 
registered right. Because trademark rights arise out of use and not 
registration, a party may still claim ownership of a valid mark at 
common law.186 Thus, a party like Stoller, who despite never winning 
one case and being forced to pay for all the costs of litigation in some, 
are keen on still filing suit may simply continue to do so. Although the 
presumptions of validity are not present, one can still claim rights to a 
mark based on mere use pursuant to common law and state claims of 
unfair competition. The Lanham Act still provides protection for 
unregistered marks. As such, the cancellation of a mark does not bar 
an ambitious trademark troll from bringing suit or threatening to file 
suit if a licensing agreement is not reached between the parties. Thus, 
deterrence and resulting long-term savings may be positive thinking 
rather than a realistic result of proactive cancellation by the courts. 
However, as discussed below, the threat of not only paying one’s own 
costs of litigation, but also the other party’s, may provide an even 
greater push to stop trademark trolls from filing suit for infringement 
of a mark they do not have rights in. 
                                                 
186See Posting of John L. Welsh to http://www.thettablog.blogspot.com, 
“TTABlog Says: It’s Time to Tackle the ‘Trademark Trolls,’” January 28, 2006 
(urging trademark practitioners to demand that the USPTO and TTAB “crack down” 
on trademark trolls).  
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VI.  AWARD OF ATTORNEY’S FEES AND COSTS: LACK OF EVIDENCE OF 
COMMERCIAL USE  
 
Where mark cancellation and an award of attorney’s fees and 
costs to the defendant are combined, it provides powerful incentives to 
only bring suit where a party has confidence in the right to use that 
mark. The Seventh Circuit also has a highly unique way of 
characterizing the standard under which it reviews a district court’s 
award of attorney fees. In reviewing the award in Central 
Manufacturing, the court stated, “[w]e will not reverse a determination 
for clear error unless it strikes us as wrong with the force of a 5-week-
old, unrefrigerated, dead fish.”187 In applying this “olfactory standard” 
the court found that the only thing that stunk was the defendant’s 
actions in filing suit.188  
Aside from this notable characterization of the standard of review 
for attorney’s fees, the Seventh Circuit’s review of attorney’s fees 
under the Lanham Act has had a colorful progression.189 While an 
award of attorneys’ fees to the prevailing party is the exception and not 
the rule, the Seventh Circuit has broadened the scope of “exceptional” 
cases to include not just pre-litigation, but also litigation, conduct.190  
                                                 
187 Id.  
188 See Rodriguez v. Anderson, 973 F.2d 550, 553 (7th Cir. 1992) (describing 
this standard of review as an olfactory one). The “dead fish” standard apparently 
originated with Jude Bauer in Parts and Elec. Motors, Inc. v. Sterling Elec., Inc., 866 
F.2d 228, 233 (7thCir.1988),  an antitrust case and was also used by Judge Evans in 
an earlier trademark infringement case, S Industries, Inc. v. Centra 2000 Inc.,  249 
F.3d 625, 627 (7thCir. 2001), also involving the Stoller. It seems as though Judge 
Evans reinvented this language and applied it to the trademark contest due to the 
nature of the Stoller’s actions. 
189 See generally Anne M. Mellen, Awarding Attorneys’ Fees Under The 
Lanham Act: Egregious Litigation Conduct In The Exceptional Case, 74 U. CIN. L. 
REV. 1111, 1115 (2004). 
190 Id. at 1117 (arguing that “no court has gone as far as the Seventh Circuit, 
which shifted attorneys fees for egregious litigation conduct other than of the filing 
of vexatious or harassing lawsuits” in discussion of  TE-TA-MA Truth Foundation-
Family of URI, Inc. v. World Church of the Creator, 297 F.3d 662 (7thCir. 2002)).  
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Generally, the award of attorney’s fees and litigation costs is an 
atypical occurrence in trademark litigation.191 There are five possible 
bases for awarding attorney fees under federal law.192 First, the 
Lanham Act provides for the award of attorneys to the prevailing party 
for “exceptional cases.”193 Congress added this section in order to 
address the issue of intentional counterfeiting, which makes an award 
“virtually mandatory” in such cases.194 Courts may also authorize 
attorney fees under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 38 where an 
appeal is “frivolous”195 and likewise under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 11 in the form of sanctions.196 Of course, all federal courts 
have the power to award attorneys fees in cases of bad-faith litigation 
practices.197 These awards are available to the prevailing party, whether 
that is the prevailing plaintiff or a prevailing defendant.198  
                                                 
191 See id. at 1115.  
192 Theodore H. Davis, Jr. & Jordan S. Weinstein, The Fifty-Eighth Year of 
Administration of the Lanham Trademark Act of 1946, 96 TRADEMARK REP. 6, 191 -
192 (2006) (“It is possible in some jurisdictions for prevailing parties to secure 
awards of attorneys' fees under state law. Nevertheless, most cases to have addressed 
the subject have done so under federal law, which generally recognizes five bases for 
fee awards.”). 
193 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (2000). This 1967 Amendment to the Lanham Act has 
been commonly regarded as a response to the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing, Co., 386 U.S. 714 (1967) which 
held that federal courts did not possess the power to grant attorney fee awards under 
the Lanham Act. See also Davis & Weinstein, supra note 192, at 191 - 192 (2006) 
194 See Rolex Watch U.S.A., Inc. v. Michel Co., 179 F.3d 704, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d 
1939 (9th Cir. 1999) (distinguishing between awards under Section 35(a) and 
Section 25(b) of the Lanham Act; see also Davis & Weinstein, supra note 192, at 
191-192 (noting that award of attorney’s fees is required by court in cases of 
intentional counterfeiting “unless the court finds extenuating circumstances”).  
195 Fed. R. App. P. 38 (“If a court of appeals determines that an appeal is 
frivolous, it may, after a separately filed motion or notice from the court and 
reasonable opportunity to respond, award just damages and single or double costs to 
the appellee.”); see also Davis & Weinstein, supra note 192, at 191-192 (2006). 
196 Fed. R. Civ. P. 11; see also Davis & Weinstein, supra note 192, at 191 -192 
(2006). 
197 Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 45 (1991). 
 198 Central Manufacturing, Inc. v. Brett, 2005 WL 2445898 *1, 13 (N.D. Ill. 
Sept. 30, 2005) aff’d, 492 F.3d 876, 880 (7th Cir. 2007); see also 15 U.S.C. § 
1117(a). 
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As the district court in Central Manufacturing also explained, 
there exists a sixth basis to award attorney’s fees and costs in 
trademark litigation where the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive 
Business Practice Act (“ICA”) is invoked.199 Stoller alleged a violation 
of the ICA in addition to his Lanham Act claims.200 This is the Illinois 
state equivalent to a trademark statute and essentially traces Section 
1114 of the Lanham Act. A person is engaged in a deceptive trade 
practice if “during the course of his or her business: … (2) causes 
likelihood of confusion or of misunderstanding as to the source, 
sponsorship, approval or certification of goods or services … [or] (3) 
causes likelihood of confusion or of misunderstanding as to affiliation, 
connection, or association with or certification by another.”201 
These claims were resolved against him for the same reasons his 
Lanham Act claims were rejected: he failed to prove that he had a 
protectable mark and the defendant’s use was not likely to cause 
confusion.202 The district court only identified two sources of law 
authorizing the award of attorneys’ fees: the Lanham Act and the ICA. 
Under both, the court has discretion to award attorneys’ fees to the 
prevailing parties.203 As noted above, to qualify under the Lanham Act, 
the case must be “exceptional.”204 Under the ICA standard, a prevailing 
defendant must show that the plaintiff’s suit was “oppressive.”205 The 
Seventh Circuit has held that, “a suit can be oppressive because of a 
lack of merit and cost of defending though the plaintiff honestly 
though mistakenly believes that he has a good case and is not trying 
merely to extract a settlement based on the suit's nuisance value.”206 
This standard is “malicious, fraudulent, deliberate or willful 
                                                 
199 Central Manufacturing, Inc., 2005 WL 2445898 at *13, citing Illinois 
Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act, 815 ILCS 510/1 (West 2007). 
200 Central Manufacturing Inc., 2005 WL 2445898 at *13. 
201 815 ILCS 510/2.  
202 Id. 
203 Id; see also15 U.S.C. § 1117(a); see also 815 ILCS 510/10a(c). 
204 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a).  
205 Central Manufacturing Inc v. Brett, 2005 WL 2445898, *1, 13 (N.D. Ill. 
Sept. 30, 2005) aff’d, 492 F.3d 876, 880 (7th Cir. 2007). 
206 Id.   
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conduct.”207 The district court found this standard unquestionably met 
in this case: not only did Stoller offer useless, contradictory, and 
“seemingly fantastical” documents and uncorroborated “arguably 
false” testimony, but brought suit before he had even obtained the ‘249 
registration.208 Having found that Stoller’s actions met the 
“oppressive” standard under the ICA, the court also held that this case 
was an “exceptional” one, finding a second basis to award attorney’s 
fees and costs.209 The court reasoned that the plaintiffs exemplified 
“paradigmatic examples of litigants in the business of bringing 
oppressive litigation designed to extract settlement.”210 
Although the district court Central Manufacturing seemed to 
suggest that the standard for awarding attorneys’ fees and costs were 
different under the Lanham Act and under the ICA (“exceptional” 
versus “oppressive”), two trademark decisions by the Seventh Circuit 
clarify that the court considers this standard to be the same. First, in 
Door Systems v. Pro-Line Door Systems, Inc.,211 the Seventh Circuit 
held that the “canonical formula” for determining whether to award 
attorney’s fees to the defendant in a Lanham Act case in the Seventh 
Circuit is “malicious, fraudulent, deliberate, or willful.”212 In Te-Ta-Ma 
Truth Foundation-Family of URI, Inc. v. World Church of the Creator, 
the Seventh Circuit confirmed its holding in Door Systems, stating “we 
concluded that [in a Lanham Act case] the appropriate inquiry when 
the defendant is the prevailing party is whether the plaintiff’s suit is 
oppressive….[w]e have clarified that a suit may be oppressive “if it 
lacked merit, had elements of an abuse of process claim, and [the] 
plaintiff's conduct unreasonably increased the cost of defending 
against the suit.”213  
In this case, however, this was a distinction without a difference. It 
was obvious that the plaintiff’s actions constituted vexatious and 
                                                 
207 Id. 
208 Id. at *13-14. 
209 Id. at *14. 
210 Id. 
211 126 F.3d 1028, 1031 (7th Cir. 1997). 
212 Id. 
213 392 F.3d 248 257-58 (7th Cir. 2004).  
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wasteful litigation warranting reprisal and the award of attorneys’ fees 
and costs. The question of whether the failure to provide evidence of 
commercial use after bringing a trademark infringement suit will 
always rise to the level of egregiousness in order to qualify for an 
award of attorney’s fees and costs is a fact intensive question assessed 
on a case-by-case basis.214  
However, the statutory mandate is explicitly apparent: if one does 
not use a mark in commerce one does not have ownership rights to 
that mark. Accordingly, where it is clear at the outset of filing suit that 
the plaintiff’s theory of ownership is meritless or lacking in 
evidentiary support, the plaintiff’s conduct should be considered 
sufficiently culpable to meet the Seventh Circuit’s “oppressive” 
standard and the award of attorneys’ fees and costs should be awarded. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
It is axiomatic that the commercial use of a trademark and not its 
registration confers enforceable rights in that mark. As basic as it may 
seem to those well-versed in the field of trademark law, it is apparent 
that some still misunderstand the U.S.’s use-based system of 
registration. In Central Manufacturing, the plaintiff was certainly 
confused. Fortunately, the Seventh Circuit got it right. 
The district courts should not wait for a defendant to plead 
cancellation as an affirmative defense to trademark infringement 
where it is clear that the plaintiff’s registration is invalid. Rather, 
district courts should adopt the “cancellation-as-best-course” approach 
enunciated by the Seventh Circuit in Central Manufacturing, and 
invoke the power to cancel sua sponte when given the opportunity by 
a plaintiff filing suit without valid rights to the registered mark in 
question. A more liberal invocation of the courts’ power to cancel 
promotes each of the three policy components that form the very 
foundation of trademark law: protecting producers, protecting 
consumers from confusion, and fostering fair competition. In addition, 
                                                 
214 Id. at 258 (“No one factor is determinative . . . we have concluded that a 
case may be exceptional if a losing plaintiff's litigation conduct is particularly 
egregious”). 
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the cancellation-as-best-course route provides greater certainty 
regarding the status of trademark rights by putting the public on notice 
of the district court’s trademark related judgments and refreshing the 
federal register. It will also reduce the production of trademark 
thickets thereby releasing marks into the public domain for other 
producers to make meaningful use.  
Further, a combination of the threat of cancellation and the award 
of attorney’s fees creates a powerful situation which may deter 
trademark trolls from either filing, or threatening to file, meritless 
trademark infringement suits. Although Stoller was the extreme case 
due to the nature of his extensive litigation history, Central 
Manufacturing stands for the proposition that if a party chooses to 
bring a trademark infringement suit, they better be sure to have 
credible evidence establishing commercial use. Otherwise, they may 
not only risk losing their registration, but may be forced to pay the 
costs of litigation. 
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